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SUMMARY 
A systemic accident model considers accidents as emergent phenomena from 
variability and interactions in a complex system. Air traffic risk assessments have 
predominantly been done by sequential and epidemiological accident models. In 
this paper we demonstrate that Monte Carlo simulation of safety relevant air 
traffic scenarios is a viable approach for systemic accident assessment. The 
Monte Carlo simulations are based on dynamic multi-agent models, which 
represent the distributed and dynamic interactions of various human operators 
and technical systems in a safety relevant scenario. The approach is illustrated 
for a particular runway incursion scenario, which addresses an aircraft taxiing 
towards the crossing of an active runway while its crew has inappropriate 
situation awareness. An assessment of the risk of a collision between the aircraft 
taxiing with an aircraft taking-off is presented, which is based on dedicated 
Monte Carlo simulations in combination with a validation approach of the 
simulation results. The assessment particularly focuses on the effectiveness of a 
runway incursion alert system that warns an air traffic controller, in reducing the 
safety risk for good and reduced visibility conditions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In modern large technological organizations, processes often depend on 
complex and distributed interactions between human operators and technical 
systems, where the interactions are knowledge intensive and regulated by 
procedures. A typical example is the air traffic industry, which uses advanced 
technological systems (e.g. aircraft, communication/navigation/surveillance 
systems), is knowledge and procedure intensive, and involves interactions 
between many humans (e.g. pilots, air traffic controllers, airline centre 
operators).  
 
From a safety assessment point of view, determinants of the complexity of an 
organization under study include: 
• the number and types of entities in the organization (human roles, technical 
systems); 
• the number and types of interdependencies between entities in the 
organization; 
• the degree of distribution of the entities (single/multiple locations); 
• the types of dynamic performance of the entities (static/slow/fast);  
• the number and types of hazards in the organization, i.e. 
situations/conditions that potentially affect the level of safety.   
In this respect, air traffic stands out as being very complex.  
 
It is argued by Perrow (1984) that as result of the growing complexity of socio-
technical systems and the human inability to understand and control those, 
accidents should be considered natural occurrences rather than abnormal 
phenomena. Hollnagel (2004) builds further on the notion that accidents are 
normal occurrences and stresses the role of performance variability for the origin 
of accidents. He argues that human performance must be variable because of the 
complexity of the socio-technical environment, and that it is the variability of 
performance rather than the complexity of systems as such that is the main 
reason for accidents. As a basis for analysis of performance variability, Pariès 
(2006) points out that to understand the properties of a complex system, we lay 
relationships between micro and macro levels, such that macro level properties 
emerge from assembling micro level properties. In this argumentation, the 
resilience of a complex organization to recover from mishap emerges from the 
interactions between the agents in the organization. These views indicate that for 
managing safety risk and resilience in complex organizations, we need analysis 
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approaches that account for the variability in their multi-agent performance and 
the emergence of safety occurrences from this variability.   
 
Hollnagel (2004) categorizes accident models in the following three types, 
namely two well known and established types of accident models and a third 
type that is based on above mentioned recent views: 
1. Sequential accident models describe an accident as the result of a sequence 
of events that occur in a specific order. These models assume that there are 
well-defined cause-effect links that propagate the effects of events leading to 
an accident. Examples of sequential accident models are the domino theory, 
event trees, fault trees and network models. Many methods used in practice 
are based on the traditional fault/event tree. However, as argued by Hollnagel 
(2004) and Sträter (2005), they may not be adequate to account for the 
complexity of modern socio-technical systems. 
2. Epidemiological accident models describe an accident in analogy with the 
spreading of a disease, i.e. as the outcome of a combination of factors, such 
as performance deviations, environmental conditions, barriers and latent 
conditions. Like sequential accident models, epidemiological accident models 
rely on cause-effect propagation in accidents. Examples of epidemiological 
models are the “Swiss cheese” model of Reason (1997) and Bayesian belief 
networks. Epidemiological models provide a broader basis to represent the 
complexity of accidents than sequential models by accounting for more 
complex interactions between relevant factors.  
3. Systemic accident models describe the performance of a system as a whole, 
rather than on the level of cause-effect mechanisms or epidemiological 
factors. The systemic view considers accidents as emergent phenomena from 
the variability of a system, for instance due to the dynamic interaction 
between multiple agents (humans, technical systems), which form a joint 
cognitive system (Hollnagel and Woods, 2005). Examples of systemic models 
can be found in control theory and chaos theory. Hollnagel (2004) explains 
how this may lead to stochastic resonance in a joint cognitive system. Unlike 
sequential and epidemiological models, systemic models do not rely on fixed 
cause-effect relations and pass the limitations of sequential and 
epidemiological models in accounting for the dynamic, non-linear and 
possibly resonance-like nature of the interactions that may lead to accidents. 
 
For safety assessment of air traffic, the two established types of accident models 
have been rather well developed. Sequential accident models are commonly 
known and applied in aviation. Fault and event trees are often applied in system 
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dependability and safety requirement studies for air traffic (Eurocontrol, 2004a, 
2006; EUROCAE, 2000). Epidemiological accident models have recently been 
used in air traffic safety assessment methods such as the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (Wiegmann and Shappel, 2001) and Bayesian 
belief networks for air transport safety (Greenberg et al., 2005; Kardes and 
Luxhoj, 2005; Ale et al., 2006).  
 
Systemic accident models are less well known for air traffic safety assessment. 
Nevertheless, in the light of above discussion on risk assessment of complex 
systems, this type of model is pre-eminently suited to account for the distributed 
and dynamic nature of air traffic operations in safety assessment. Motivated by 
stochastic system and control theory, researchers at NLR have developed a 
methodology for the evaluation of air traffic risk, which coincides well with the 
systemic accident model view of Hollnagel (2004). This methodology uses Monte 
Carlo simulations and uncertainty evaluations to analyse the safety risk of air 
traffic operations. In (Blom et al., 2001a,b, 2003) an initial version of this 
methodology has been introduced under the name TOPAZ (Traffic Organization 
and Perturbation AnalyZer). Subsequently, the TOPAZ methodology has been 
extended with multi-agent situation awareness modelling (Stroeve et al., 2003), 
an integrated qualitative safety risk assessment cycle (Blom et al., 2006), risk 
bias and uncertainty assessment (Everdij et al., 2006a), and compositional 
specification of accident models (Everdij et al., 2006b). Recently, also other 
researchers have described the behaviour of an air traffic management system as 
being emergent from the combined actions of individual entities in the system, 
which can be analysed effectively by agent-based simulations (Shah et al., 2005; 
Lee et al., 2007).   
 
The aim of this paper is to show that Monte Carlo simulation of safety-relevant 
scenarios with dynamically interacting agents enables systemic accident risk 
assessment well. Our example application is a runway incursion scenario, which 
deals with multiple concurrently interacting human operators and technical 
systems. In particular, the assessment considers the risk of a collision between 
an aircraft taking-off with an aircraft taxiing inappropriately across the runway, 
and focuses on the effectiveness of a runway incursion alert system in reducing 
the safety risk. The systemic risk assessment approach portrayed in this paper 
intends to be an effective means to provide feedback to designers of complex air 
traffic operations.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the runway incursion 
safety issue and describes the aerodrome operation for which the runway 
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incursion risk is evaluated. Section 3 describes the safety assessment cycle used 
for the evaluation of the runway incursion risk and introduces the types of 
models applied in this cycle. Section 4 describes the Monte Carlo simulation 
model that is developed for the runway incursion scenario. Section 5 presents 
the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. Section 6 gives a validation approach 
of the simulation results, which provides an evaluation of bias and uncertainty in 
the risk. Section 7 presents a discussion. 
 
An early version of this paper was presented at the Eurocontrol Safety R&D 
Seminar 2006 (Stroeve et al., 2006). 
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2 RUNWAY INCURSION SCENARIO 
2.1 RUNWAY INCURSION 
A runway incursion is defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) as “Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an 
aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the 
landing and take off of aircraft”. Within air traffic, the risk of runway incursion is 
recognised as an important safety issue. Safety programmes such as 
(Eurocontrol, 2004b) promote procedures and training to reduce runway 
incursion risk, such as following ICAO compliant procedures and naming, 
applying standard radiotelephony (R/T) phraseology, pilot training on aerodrome 
signage and markings, using standard taxi routes, etc. In addition to procedure 
and training related measures, research and development is done on new 
technology in the aircraft, air traffic control (ATC) tower, ground vehicles and 
aerodrome. Part of these systems aim to reduce the probability of runway 
incursion by enhancing situation awareness, providing improved guidance on the 
aerodrome and supporting efficient communication. Other systems aim to 
reduce the consequences of a runway incursion by alerting one or more involved 
operators.  
 
In this latter class, runway incursion alert systems directed to the controller are 
commercially available. False alerts are a well-known problem with such systems. 
The conditions under which well-functioning ATC runway incursion alerting may 
be effective are, however, not well known in the safety literature. Assessment of 
runway incursion risk and of the potential effect of runway incursion risk 
reducing measures and technologies are demanding tasks, given the large 
number of human operators, aircraft and supporting technical systems that 
closely interact on the aerodrome. An analysis with a systemic accident model of 
a multi-agent runway incursion scenario is considered in this paper. 
 
2.2 AERODROME OPERATION FOR RUNWAY INCURSION SCENARIO 
The runway considered is used for departures and has a taxiway that crosses the 
runway at a distance of 1000 m from the runway threshold (see Figure 1). The 
runway crossing may be used for taxiing between the apron and a second 
runway, according to a runway crossing procedure that will be outlined later. The 
runway crossing has stopbars that are remotely controlled by the runway 
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controller. In the runway incursion scenario a taxiing aircraft is crossing the 
runway while it should not due to inappropriate situation awareness of its pilots. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the traffic situation considered. The taking-off aircraft 
accelerates along the runway while the crew of the taxiing aircraft intends to proceed 
along the taxiway towards the active runway. The various human operators and technical 
systems are discussed in the main text. 
 
The operation is considered for weather conditions without wind and for two 
visibility conditions: 
• Visibility condition 1: unrestricted visibility range; implying that pilots as well 
as controllers can visually observe the traffic situation. This is in line with 
visibility condition 1 of (ICAO, 2004). 
• Visibility condition 2: visibility range between 400 m and 1500 m; implying 
that controllers cannot visually observe the traffic and pilots are not always 
able to see the conflicting aircraft during the initial part of the take-off run. 
The lower limit of this visibility range (400 m) is equal to the upper limit of 
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the runway visible range of visibility condition 3 indicated in (ICAO, 2004); 
the upper limit (1500 m) is chosen for this study (no value is given in (ICAO, 
2004)). 
 
The main human operators involved in the runway crossing operation are the 
pilots of the taking-off aircraft, the pilots of the taxiing aircraft, the runway 
controller and the ground controllers responsible for traffic on nearby taxiways. 
The pilots are responsible for safe conduct of the flight operations and should 
actively monitor for potential conflicting traffic situations. The runway controller 
is responsible for safe and efficient traffic handling on the runway and the 
runway crossings. The ground controllers are responsible for safe and efficient 
traffic handling on taxiways in the surroundings of the runway. 
 
Aircraft may taxi across the active runway via the following procedure. The 
control over the taxiing aircraft is transferred from the responsible ground 
controller to the runway controller (including a change of the R/T frequency). 
Taking into consideration the traffic situation, the runway controller specifies a 
crossing clearance to the taxiing aircraft and switches off the remotely controlled 
stopbar. The crew of the taxiing aircraft acknowledges the clearance and initiates 
taxiing across the runway. After passage of the stopbar, it is automatically 
switched on again. The crew reports when the taxiing aircraft has vacated the 
runway, upon which the control over the aircraft is transferred from the runway 
controller to the responsible ground controller.  
 
A runway incursion alert system (RIAS) may generate two types of alerts to warn 
the runway controller: 
• Runway incursion alert  for the situation that an aircraft is crossing the 
runway in front of an aircraft that has initiated to take off; 
• Stopbar violation alert for the situation that an aircraft crosses an active 
stopbar in the direction of the runway. 
These alerts consist of audible warnings and an indication on the ground 
surveillance display. The alerts are based on ground radar tracking data. The 
alert system is considered to have a high probability of detection and a low 
probability of a false alert. 
 
Standard communication, navigation and surveillance systems are used: 
• Communication between controllers and crews is by R/T systems; 
• The pilots use their knowledge on the aerodrome layout and maps for 
taxiing; 
• Ground radar tracking data of all aircraft and sufficiently large vehicles on the 
airport surface is shown on displays of the runway and ground controllers.   
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3 SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT CYCLE 
3.1 STEPS IN THE SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT CYCLE 
An overview of the steps in a TOPAZ safety risk assessment cycle is given in 
Figure 2. In step 0, the objective of the assessment is determined, as well as the 
safety context, the scope and the level of detail of the assessment. Step 1 serves 
to obtain a complete overview of the operation. Next, hazards associated with 
the operation are identified (step 2), and aggregated into safety relevant 
scenarios (step 3). Using severity and frequency assessments (steps 4 and 5), the 
safety risk associated with each safety relevant scenario is classified (step 6). For 
each safety relevant scenario with a (possibly) unacceptable safety risk, the main 
sources contributing to the lack of safety (safety bottlenecks) are identified (step 
7). A more detailed discussion of the processes in these steps is provided in 
(Blom et al., 2006).  
Decision 
making
Determine 
operation1
Assess risk 
tolerability6
Identify 
severities4
Identify safety 
bottlenecks7
Assess 
frequency5
Construct 
scenarios3Identifyhazards2
Iterate
(option)
Identify 
objective0
Operational
development
 
Figure 2: Steps in TOPAZ safety risk assessment cycle 
 
The main results of the risk assessment cycle are the assessed risk levels and the 
identified safety bottlenecks. These results support decision making about the 
acceptability of the operation and identification of mitigating measures or 
improvements in the operation design. If the design is changed, a new safety risk 
assessment cycle of the operation should be performed in order to investigate 
how much the risk posed by previous safety issues has been decreased, but also 
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to assess any new safety issues that may have been introduced by the 
enhancements themselves.  
 
Systemic accident modelling and Monte Carlo simulation play a key role in step 
5, as will be discussed in Section 4 and following. To clarify the context of the 
Monte Carlo simulations, safety relevant scenario diagrams and the associated 
severity and frequency assessments are discussed next. 
 
3.2 SAFETY RELEVANT SCENARIO DIAGRAM 
A safety relevant scenario diagram is developed in step 3 on the basis of hazards 
identified in step 2. It represents relations between events/conditions that may 
lead to potentially hazardous air traffic situations and events/conditions that 
may hamper resolution of these air traffic situations. Figure 3 presents a generic 
safety relevant scenario diagram. In the context of the runway crossing 
operation, examples of the elements in Figure 3 are: 
• Root hazard a: Pilots react on clearance for another aircraft and start 
crossing; 
• Root hazard b: Pilots cross without clearance; 
• Hazardous situation: Aircraft crossing runway while it should not; 
• Condition: Other aircraft has initiated take-off; 
• Conflict: Aircraft taking off while another aircraft is crossing the runway and 
it should not; 
• Resolution hazard c: Pilots of crossing aircraft do not frequently look for 
conflicting traffic; 
• Resolution hazard d: Pilots of crossing aircraft are not tuned to frequency of 
runway controller communication system; 
• Conflict evolution: Possible ways of evolution of the runway incursion 
conflict, e.g. leading to some incident or an accident. 
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Figure 3: Generic safety relevant scenario diagram 
 
By application of step 2 for the active runway crossing operation, the following 
safety relevant scenarios were identified (Blom et al. 2006): 
• Scenario I: Aircraft erroneously in take-off and crossing aircraft on runway; 
• Scenario II: Aircraft erroneously crossing and other aircraft in take-off; 
• Scenario III: Aircraft taking off and runway unexpectedly occupied; 
• Scenario IV: Aircraft crossing and runway unexpectedly occupied by aircraft; 
• Scenario V: Aircraft crossing and vehicle on runway; 
• Scenario VI: Collision between aircraft sliding off runway and aircraft near 
crossing; 
• Scenario VII: Aircraft taking off and vehicle crossing; 
• Scenario VIII: Jet-blast from one aircraft to another; and 
• Scenario IX: Conflict between aircraft overrunning/climbing out low and 
aircraft using a nearby taxiway. 
For our study of systemic accident assessment by Monte Carlo simulation we 
focus on scenario II in the sequel of this paper. 
 
3.3 SEVERITY AND FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT 
In step 4 of the safety risk assessment cycle, an evaluation is made of the range 
of severity categories that may apply to the possible ways of conflict evolution of 
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the safety relevant scenario. For instance, the severity of the outcome of a 
scenario may be considered ‘serious incident’ if the aircraft only avoid a collision 
at a short distance, or the severity category is ‘accident’ in case of a collision. 
The severity assessment does not address an evaluation of the probability of the 
severity; it simply assesses which severity categories may occur and which not, 
and it describes the associated characteristics of the conflict evolution. For 
scenario II, the most severe consequence is a collision between the two aircraft. 
To support risk assessment for the most severe consequences, the Monte Carlo 
simulations should thus support the assessment of the scenario up to the level of 
collision.  
 
Next, in step 5, the occurrence frequency of the severity categories in the safety 
relevant scenario is assessed. In the Monte Carlo simulation based risk 
assessment of scenario II, we focus on the frequency of collisions between 
aircraft taxiing and taking-off. Referring to Figure 3, these Monte Carlo 
simulations represent the dynamic interactions of the agents in the initiation and 
evolution of the conflict between the two aircraft, given the hazardous situation 
that the taxiing aircraft is approaching the runway crossing while it should not. 
The Monte Carlo simulations thus provide the data for determination of 
conditional collision probabilities given the specific hazardous situations and 
contextual conditions. In a complete risk assessment also the probabilities of the 
hazardous situations (e.g. misconceptions, failures) and contextual conditions 
(e.g. visibility conditions) should be evaluated and combined with the conditional 
collision risks to obtain to overall accident risk of the scenario. In our risk 
assessments, primary sources of data for determination of such event 
probabilities are operational experts (e.g. pilots and controllers) and databases 
(e.g. aviation safety databases, local controller reporting systems).   
 
The evolution of the conflict in the scenario may depend on a wide range of 
hazards and conditions. In particular, the specifics of the dynamic interactions 
between the agents in the Monte Carlo simulations may depend on the root 
hazards, the contextual conditions and the resolution hazards of the scenario. In 
this way, latent conditions that influence the performance of agents can be 
introduced. For instance, if the pilots of the taxiing aircraft believe to be 
proceeding on a normal taxiway, their visual monitoring performance differs 
from the situation when they know to be heading towards a runway crossing. An 
overview of the main interactions between the agents in the Monte Carlo 
simulation model of the runway crossing scenario is presented next.  
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4 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION MODEL 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF A DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC MULTI-AGENT MODEL 
The Monte Carlo simulations for safety analysis of air traffic scenarios are based 
on mathematical models, which uniquely define the stochastic dynamics of the 
related agents (human operators and technical systems). These models are 
specified by a compositional specification approach using a stochastic dynamic 
extension of the Petri net formalism (Everdij and Blom, 2006b). Within this Petri 
net formalism a hierarchically structured representation of the agents in the air 
traffic scenario is developed, including: 
• Key aspects of the agents, e.g. situation awareness / task performance / task 
scheduling of a human operator, flight phases / performance modes of 
aircraft, or availability / status of an alert system; 
• Modes within the key aspects of agents, e.g. task performance of a controller 
is monitoring / clearance specification / alert reaction, flight phase is taxiing 
/ take-off run / rejected take-off / hold, or system availability is up / down; 
• Dynamics within modes, e.g. the time needed for task performance, or the 
acceleration profile during take-off run, or the duration of an alert; 
• Interactions between modes within key aspects, e.g. the transition to a next 
task, the transition to another flight phase, or a change in the availability of a 
system; 
• Interactions between key aspects of an agent, e.g. the effect of situation 
awareness on task performance, the effect of an engine failure on a flight 
phase, or the effect of availability on the status of an alert; 
• Interactions between agents, e.g. the effect of task performance of a pilot on 
the flight phase of an aircraft, or the effect of an alert on the situation 
awareness of a controller. 
Here, the dynamics and interactions include deterministic and stochastic 
relationships, as is appropriate for the human performance or system 
considered. 
 
4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE RUNWAY INCURSION MODEL 
Figure 4 shows an overview of the interactions between the main agents of the 
runway incursion risk assessment model. A high-level description of the model is 
provided next. 
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Taking-off 
aircraft
Runway 
controller
ATC system: 
R/T
Taxiing
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Pilot flying
taking-off 
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Pilot flying 
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aircraft
ATC system:  
Surveillance 
ATC system:
RIAS
 
Figure 4: Interactions between the main agents of the runway incursion risk assessment 
model: aircraft, pilots flying, runway controller and ATC system (R/T, RIAS and 
surveillance) 
VISIBILITY CONDITION 
In the model, two visibility conditions are used: 
• Visibility condition 1 with an unconstrained visibility range; 
• Visibility condition 2 with a visibility range uniformly distributed between 400 
m and 1500 m. 
 
TAKING-OFF AIRCRAFT 
The model of the taking-off aircraft represents the ground run, airborne 
transition and airborne climb-out phases during take-off and includes the 
possibility of a rejected take-off. The aircraft initiates take-off from a position 
near the runway threshold. The aircraft may have diminished acceleration or 
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deceleration power. Two types of aircraft are included in the model: medium-
weight aircraft and heavy-weight aircraft.  
 
TAXIING AIRCRAFT 
The model of the taxiing aircraft represents aircraft movements (hold, 
acceleration, constant speed, deceleration) during taxiing. The taxiing aircraft 
enters the taxiway leading to the runway crossing at a position close to the 
remotely controlled stopbar (see Figure 1) with a normally distributed taxiing 
speed, or initiates taxiing from stance. The entrance time of the crossing aircraft 
is uniformly distributed around the take-off start time. The taxiing aircraft may 
have diminished deceleration power. Two types of aircraft are included in the 
model: medium-weight aircraft and heavy-weight aircraft. 
 
SURVEILLANCE (ATC SUBSYSTEM) 
The model of the surveillance system provides position and velocity estimates for 
both aircraft. There is a chance that the surveillance system is not available, 
resulting in track loss. Surveillance data is used by the ATC runway incursion 
alert system. In visibility condition 2, surveillance data is used for monitoring by 
the runway controller. 
 
RIAS (ATC SUBSYSTEM) 
The model of the runway incursion alert system includes two types of alerts: 
• A stopbar violation alert is presented to the controller if surveillance data 
indicates that an aircraft has passed an active stopbar. There is a chance that 
the stopbar violation alert is not functioning. 
• A runway incursion alert is presented to the controller if surveillance data 
indicates that the taxiing aircraft is within a critical distance of the runway 
centre-line and the taking-off aircraft has exceeded a velocity threshold in 
front of the runway crossing. There is a chance that the runway incursion 
alert is not functioning. 
 
R/T (ATC SUBSYSTEM) 
The model for the R/T system between the runway controller and the aircraft 
crews accounts for the communication system of the aircraft, the communication 
system of the controller, the tower communication system and the frequency 
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selection of the aircraft communication system. The nominal status of these 
communication systems accounts for direct non-delaying communication. The 
model accounts for the chance of delay or failure of the communication systems. 
 
PILOT FLYING OF TAKING-OFF AIRCRAFT 
The model for the performance of the pilot flying (PF) of the taking-off aircraft 
accounts for performance of tasks such as auditory monitoring, visual 
monitoring, crew coordination, aircraft control, and conflict detection and 
reaction. The model includes dynamic representations of the situation awareness 
of the pilot, the cognitive control mode of the pilot and task scheduling by the 
pilot. 
 
Initially, the PF of the taking-off aircraft is aware that take-off is allowed and 
initiates a take-off. During the take-off the PF visually monitors the traffic 
situation on the runway. During a monitoring action the PF may not observe the 
intruding taxiing aircraft, primarily because the distance with the crossing 
aircraft exceeds a maximum viewing distance set by the visibility condition. The 
PF of the taking-off aircraft may detect a conflict with a taxiing aircraft, 
• if the taxiing aircraft is observed to be within a critical distance of the 
runway, or  
• due to an R/T call of a controller. A controller call may, however, not be 
properly understood by the PF.  
Following conflict detection, the PF starts a collision avoiding braking action if it 
is expected that braking will stop the aircraft in front of the taxiing aircraft. 
 
PILOT FLYING OF TAXIING AIRCRAFT 
The model structure for the PF of the taxiing aircraft is similar to that of PF of the 
taking-off aircraft.  Initially, the PF of the taxiing aircraft may intend to continue 
taxiing on a regular taxiway (not crossing a runway) or to cross the active 
runway.  Note that in both cases the situation awareness of the PF is not correct. 
During taxiing the PF visually monitors the traffic situation. If the PF is aware to 
be approaching the runway crossing, visual monitoring is done more frequently 
than in the case that the PF is aware to be on a regular taxiway. The PF may 
detect a conflict with the taking-off aircraft,  
• if the taxiing aircraft is within a critical distance of the runway, the taking-off 
aircraft approaches the taxiing aircraft and the speed of the taking-off aircraft 
exceeds a threshold value, or 
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• due to an R/T call of a controller. A controller call may, however, not be 
properly understood by the PF.  
Following conflict detection, the PF starts a collision avoiding braking action 
unless the taxiing aircraft already is within a critical distance of the runway 
centre-line. 
 
RUNWAY CONTROLLER 
The model for the performance of the runway controller accounts for 
performance of tasks such as visual monitoring, communication with aircraft 
crews, ATC coordination, and conflict detection and reaction. The model includes 
dynamic representations of the situation awareness of the controller, the 
cognitive control mode of the controller and task scheduling by the controller. 
 
The runway controller monitors the traffic situation on the runway and is 
supported by stopbar violation alerting and runway incursion alerting systems. 
Monitoring is done visually in visibility condition 1 and is done via ATC 
surveillance data in visibility condition 2. The situation awareness updating times 
as a result of monitoring depend on other controller tasks, such as co-ordination 
with other controllers and complementary communication with aircraft crews. 
The controller may detect a safety-critical situation, 
• if the controller observes that the taxiing aircraft has passed the stopbar, or 
• due to a stopbar violation alert, or 
• due to a runway incursion alert. 
Following detection of the safety-critical situation, the controller instructs both 
the taxiing aircraft and the taking-off aircraft to hold. 
 
4.3 PARAMETERISATION OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
Once the mathematical structure of the simulation model has been specified 
(agents, key aspects, modes, dynamics and all interactions), appropriate 
parameter values should be chosen that represent the operation considered. 
Parameter values are based on a variety of sources, such as  
• technical system specifications, e.g. requirement on availability of alert 
system; 
• scientific expertise and literature on safety and human factors, e.g. task 
performance; 
• searches in incident databases, e.g. frequency of specific runway incursions; 
• interviews with operational experts, e.g. scanning patterns by pilot; 
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• measurement data from real operations, e.g. taxiing speeds; 
• measurement data from real-time simulations, e.g. controller performance 
aspects; 
• simulation results from other relevant models, e.g. Air-MIDAS human 
performance modelling (Corker, 2000; Blom et al., 2005). 
 
In practice, limited data on appropriate parameter values is available for the 
contextual conditions considered, leading to a credibility interval of possible 
parameter values. Typically, the mean of this interval is chosen for the simulation 
model and an analysis of the effect of the uncertainty in the parameter value on 
the risk is included in a bias and uncertainty assessment (see Section 6). If the 
uncertainty in the parameter value has a significant effect on the risk, an 
additional effort may be done to attain a better estimate. 
 
4.4 SPEED-UP OF MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
Air traffic is a very safe means of transport. Consequently, the risk of collision 
between two aircraft is extremely low. The assessment of such low collision risk 
values through straightforward Monte Carlo simulation would need extremely 
lengthy computer simulation periods. Therefore, speed-up of Monte Carlo 
simulations is required, which may be achieved by risk decomposition. This 
consists of decomposing accident risk simulations in a sequence of conditional 
Monte Carlo simulations and combining the results of these conditional 
simulations into the assessed collision risk value. To this end, we use stochastic 
analysis tools to model and analyse in a proper way the arbitrary stochastic event 
sequences (including dependent events) and the conditional probabilities of such 
event sequences in stochastic dynamic processes (Blom et al., 2003).  
 
For the active runway crossing example, the particular conditions taken into 
account for this risk decomposition are: 
(a) Type of each aircraft (medium-weight or heavy-weight); 
(b) Remotely controlled stopbar (functioning or not);  
(c) Communication systems (functioning or not); 
(d) RIAS (functioning or not); 
(e) Situation awareness (SA) of the PF of the taxiing aircraft concerning allowance 
of runway crossing (allowed / not allowed); 
(f) SA of the PF of the taxiing aircraft concerning the next way-point 
(taxiway/crossing); 
(g) Visibility condition (1 or 2). 
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For the results presented in this paper, event probabilities of conditions (a) to (e) 
are included in the Monte Carlo simulations. Conditional collision risks are 
assessed given (f) and (g), i.e. given the two options for the SA of the PF of the 
taxiing aircraft and given the two options for the visibility condition (resulting in 
four combined options).  
 
Based on the simulation model and the accident risk decomposition, Monte Carlo 
simulation software is developed to evaluate the event probabilities and the 
conditional collision risks, and to compose the collision risk assessed by the 
simulation model. In the remainder of this paper conditional collision risks are 
estimated given conditions (f) and (g). Results for total collision risks, obtained 
by combining conditional risks with the probabilities of the conditions, are 
provided in (Stroeve et al., 2003) and (Blom et al., 2006) for visibility condition 1. 
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5 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF RUNWAY 
INCURSION 
Point estimates of the conditional collision risks achieved in the Monte Carlo 
simulations on the basis of the model and software described in Section 4 are 
shown in Figure 5 for the cases with and without the runway incursion alert 
system. The collision risks are conditional on the visibility condition and the 
situation awareness of the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft, which represents 
the intention to either continue taxiing on the current regular taxiway or to cross 
the runway. 
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Figure 5: Monte Carlo simulation results for conditional collision risk given situation 
awareness of pilot flying of taxiing aircraft (Proceed taxiway / Cross runway) and visibility 
condition (1 / 2) for the cases without and with RIAS 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation results in Figure 5 show that for an unrestricted 
visibility range (visibility condition 1) the conditional collision risk strongly 
depends on the situation awareness of the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft. This 
difference is mainly caused by the improved (more frequent) monitoring strategy 
in the model for the case that the pilot intends to cross the runway compared to 
the case that the pilot intends to proceed on a regular taxiway. The Monte Carlo 
simulation results show that the effectiveness of the ATC alerts in visibility 
condition 1 is very small. In this situation the conflict has almost always been 
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recognised by the pilots of one or both aircraft before the controller has the 
chance to react to the alert and instruct the pilots, and in the remaining cases the 
controller can usually not timely warn the pilots. 
 
For a visibility range between 400 m and 1500 m (visibility condition 2), the 
Monte Carlo simulation-based risks are quite different. Firstly, it can be observed 
in Figure 5 that similar conditional collision risks are obtained for both the cases 
of situation awareness of the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft. In this visibility 
condition, the improved monitoring strategy of the pilot does not support early-
stage recognition of the conflict. Secondly, in this visibility condition the ATC 
alerts enable a significant reduction in the conditional collision risk. Here, the 
conflict can often not be recognised by the pilots at an early stage and the alerts 
reduce the conflict detection time for the controller. The larger effectiveness of 
the alerts for the case where the pilot is intending to cross the runway can be 
explained by the model aspect that in this case the aircraft may initiate taxiing 
from stance, thereby increasing the time before it reaches the collision critical 
zone on the runway.  
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6 BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY ASSESSMENT 
6.1 VALIDATION: ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MODEL AND 
REALITY 
By definition, any model differs from reality. Hence, validation of a model is 
supported by identification of these differences and evaluation of their impact at 
the assessed risk level in terms of bias and uncertainty: 
• Bias: the model-based accident risk is systematically higher or lower than the 
risk of the real operation; 
• Uncertainty: the model-based accident risk lies in a range of credible values 
for the risk of the real operation (e.g. a 95% credibility interval). 
 
As an integrated part of the accident risk assessment methodology TOPAZ, a bias 
and uncertainty assessment method has been developed (Everdij et al., 2006a). 
This method supports identification of differences between the Monte Carlo 
simulation model and reality, and subsequent evaluation of the bias and 
uncertainty due to these differences (see Figure 6). The Monte Carlo simulations 
provide risk point estimates and risk sensitivities that are used in the bias and 
uncertainty assessment to obtain an extended insight in the risk of the real 
operation. 
 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation Model
Reality
Bias & Uncertainty 
Assessment
Model-Reality
Differences
Risk expectation value
Risk credibility interval
True risk
Risk point estimate
Risk sensitivities
 
Figure 6: The Monte Carlo simulations play a dual role in the risk assessment by 
providing a risk point estimate and risk sensitivities, which are both used in the bias and 
uncertainty assessment 
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6.2 STEPS IN THE BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY ASSESSMENT  
The bias and uncertainty assessment method consists of the following steps: 
1. Identify all potential differences between the simulation model and reality; 
2. Assess the size/probability of each difference; 
3. Assess the sensitivity of simulation results for changes in parameter values; 
4. Assess the effect of each difference on the risk outcome; 
5. Determine the joint effects of all differences.  
A concise introduction of these steps is provided next; more details and 
mathematical background is given in (Everdij et al., 2006a).  
 
STEP 1: IDENTIFY ALL POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
SIMULATION MODEL AND REALITY 
During the development of a Monte Carlo simulation model and at the start of a 
bias and uncertainty assessment of the simulation results of a particular 
operation, a broad list of potential differences between model and reality is 
identified. No assessment of the effects of these differences is done yet, such 
that seemingly unimportant differences are also included. In support of this step, 
five types of differences are distinguished: 
• Numerical approximations: numerical approximations used for the accident 
risk evaluation of the model, e.g. the integration method used for evaluation 
of differential equations; 
• Parameter values: uncertainty/bias in the choice of values of the model 
parameters, e.g. the average velocity during taxiing; 
• Formal model structure: the model structure does not completely describe 
the air traffic scenario in all detail, e.g. conflict recognition by the ground 
controller is not included in the Monte Carlo simulation model; 
• Non-covered hazards: hazards of the operation that are not incorporated by 
the model, e.g. a hazard like ‘Aircraft in take-off has problems and runs into 
aircraft close to a crossing point’ is not represented in the Monte Carlo 
simulation model; the take-off run follows the runway centre-line; 
• Operational concept differences: differences between the operational concept 
for which the accident risk model was developed and the operational concept 
for which the accident risk is assessed, e.g. assessment of a ‘crossing behind 
take-off’-procedure by a model without such dependent crossing procedures.  
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STEP 2: ASSESS THE SIZE/PROBABILITY OF EACH DIFFERENCE 
For each difference it is assessed how large is is, or how often it may happen. In 
particular, for each parameter value the size of a 95% credibility interval and a 
bias factor are assessed. For each other type of difference, a value is assessed for 
the probability that the difference exists in the case considered. In support of 
this step, categories are defined of the sizes of bias factors and credibility 
intervals (e.g. Negligible, Small, Minor, Significant, Considerable, Major) and of 
the probabilities of differences (e.g. Unlikely, Infrequent, Frequent, Typical).  
 
STEP 3: ASSESS THE SENSITIVITY OF SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CHANGES 
IN PARAMETER VALUES  
The normalized sensitivities of the risk outcomes of the simulation model for 
changes in the parameter values are assessed. Typically, a model expert 
performs a first assessment of sensitivity categories (e.g. Negligible, Small, 
Minor, etc.) by using knowledge of the simulation model. Next, parameter values 
with sensitivities and risk effects that have been preliminary assessed to be more 
than Negligible are assessed using additional Monte Carlo simulations (for the 
assessment of risk effects feedback from step 4 is used).    
 
STEP 4: ASSESS THE EFFECT OF EACH DIFFERENCE ON THE RISK OUTCOME  
The bias and credibility interval of each parameter value are combined with the 
risk sensitivity to find the bias and credibility interval in the risk for the 
parameter value considered. For each other (non-parameter value) difference, a 
conditional risk bias given the difference exists, is assessed. This assessment 
uses feedback from operational experts and the insights gained from the 
sensitivity study in step 3. The probability that the difference exists and the 
conditional risk bias are combined to a risk bias for each difference. 
 
STEP 5: DETERMINE THE JOINT EFFECTS OF ALL DIFFERENCES      
All assessment results of the risk effects of the differences identified between the 
Monte Carlo simulation model and reality are combined to find a bias and 95% 
credibility interval of the risk (Everdij et al., 2006a). With this the expected value 
and 95% credibility interval of the risk of the scenario are achieved.         
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6.3 BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY RESULTS FOR THE RUNWAY INCURSION 
SCENARIO 
The above described bias and uncertainty assessment steps have been 
performed for the runway incursion scenario in which the pilot flying 
(erroneously) thinks to proceed on a normal taxiway, in visibility condition 1 and 
with ATC supported by a runway incursion alert system. First, safety experts 
identified differences between the Monte Carlo simulation model and reality. In 
total, 306 differences between model and reality have been identified, consisting 
of 175 parameter values and 131 other differences. Subsequently, safety experts 
made a first selection of the most important differences, i.e. the differences with 
non-negligible effects on the collision risk.  
 
For these most important differences, the opinions of two pilots and two 
controllers were obtained via structured interviews, which addressed about 25 
topics. Table 1 shows examples of the kinds of questions for the operational 
experts. It can be observed that these questions are quite different from expert 
interviews for sequential and epidemiological accident models. There, the data 
required usually are event probabilities, often conditional on the contextual 
situation, e.g. the probability of a human operator not detecting an abnormal 
situation. Here, the kinds of data are more diverse, reflecting a wide range of 
performance data for human operators and technical systems.  
 
Table 1: Examples of questions for controllers and pilots during interviews for bias and 
uncertainty assessment 
Examples of controller questions 
If the runway controller has recognised a runway incursion conflict, how long 
would it take to instruct the intruding aircraft? 
If the intruding aircraft is not on the frequency of the runway controller, how 
long would it take to reach it via coordination with a ground controller? 
In which situations would the runway controller first try to stop the aircraft 
taking-off rather than the aircraft taxiing? 
Examples of pilot questions 
How much time is required to initiate a rejected take-off after an instruction by 
ATC? 
In what situations does the PF of an aircraft taking off consider a taxiing aircraft 
as conflicting, for instance, position / speed of taxiing aircraft? 
What is the angular range for visual monitoring by the pilot flying during taxiing? 
How often does the pilot look outside during taxiing to visually monitor the 
traffic situation? 
 
The opinions of the pilots and controllers as well as the results of additional 
Monte Carlo simulations were used by the safety experts to evaluate the effect of 
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the differences on the risk. The combined effect of the identified differences on 
the bias and uncertainty in the conditional collision risk for the situation 
considered is shown in Figure 7. There is a small bias, indicating that the Monte 
Carlo simulation-based risk is somewhat conservative, and a 95% credibility 
interval with a range of a factor 6 above to a factor 30 below the expected risk 
level. 
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Figure 7: Monte Carlo simulation results of Figure 5 plus the results of the bias and 
uncertainty assessment for the case selected. The narrow bar represents the 95% 
credibility interval and the dot represents the expected value of the collision risk.  
 
In addition to an estimate of the expected risk and its credibility interval, the bias 
and uncertainty assessment gives information on the size of the effect on the 
risk of each difference and provides feedback on the aspects of the operation 
that mostly contribute to the risk. Table 2 provides a list of the differences 
between the Monte Carlo simulation model and reality with more than 30% effect 
on the bias and/or size of the credibility interval of the assessed conditional 
collision risk level in the runway incursion scenario considered. These differences 
all relate to pilot and aircraft performance. Table 3 gives examples of differences 
with less than 13% effect (95% of the differences belong to this class). It follows 
that the ATC runway incursion alert system has little effect on the assessed risk 
level for the situation considered. 
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Table 2: List of differences between model and reality with more than 30% effect on the 
bias and/or uncertainty for the selected case of the runway incursion scenario 
Differences with more than 30% effect on bias or uncertainty 
The types of manoeuvres of the taking-off aircraft that can be performed to avoid 
a collision (only braking or also other manoeuvres, e.g. lateral movement) 
The contribution of the pilot not flying of the taxiing aircraft to prevention of a 
collision 
Deciding by the pilots of the taking-off or taxiing aircraft if an other aircraft is 
considered to be conflicting 
The speed of the taxiing aircraft 
The monitoring frequency by the pilot of the taxiing aircraft 
The deceleration of taking-off and taxiing aircraft in case of braking to avoid a 
collision 
The time before braking is initiated by the pilots of the taking-off aircraft 
 
Table 3: Examples of differences between model and reality with less than 13% effect on 
the bias and/or uncertainty for the selected case of the runway incursion scenario 
Examples of differences with less than 13% effect on bias or uncertainty 
Variation in the take-off weight of the aircraft 
Variation in the take-off thrust of the aircraft 
The lift-off velocity of the aircraft 
The acceleration profile during the take-off run 
The aircraft manoeuvre during the airborne transition phase 
The take-off performance during engine failure 
The performance of the VHF R/T communication systems 
The performance of the surveillance tracking systems 
The performance of the runway incursion alert system 
The task scheduling of the runway controller 
 
6.4 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS  
The expected risk and its credibility interval support the decision making process 
regarding the acceptability of the assessed risk, the acceptability of the 
uncertainty in the assessed risk and potential further design of the operation 
considered. If the uncertainty in the assessed risk is high and this implies that 
the required target level of safety may not be attained, a reduction of the 
uncertainty may be strived for. This may be achieved by obtaining more 
information on the operation and the accident scenario considered, such as 
additional data from real operations, real-time simulations or other relevant 
Monte Carlo simulations, additional interviews with operational experts, and 
additional searches in incident databases. This additional information can then 
be used to update the simulation model, such that the effects of differences 
between model and reality are reduced. The choice for the uncertainty reducing 
approaches depends on the available means, and is supported by bias and 
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uncertainty assessment results for the most important risk determining 
differences between the simulation model and reality.  
 
The sensitivity analysis within the bias and uncertainty assessment supports the 
identification of aspects of the operation that lead to potential exceeding of 
target levels of safety (‘safety bottlenecks’). Such safety bottlenecks support 
identification of mitigating measures and redevelopment of the operation. For 
instance, if the taxiing speed at particular airport locations seems a safety 
bottleneck, it may be decided to implement speed restrictions.  
 
On the other hand, the sensitivity analysis provides insight in aspects of the 
operation that are less important for its risk. For such aspects, relatively mild 
safety requirements may be formulated that can be implemented cost effectively. 
For instance, the requirements for the availability of a runway incursion alert 
system may be less stringent if the effect of such an alert on the collision risk is 
small. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
A systemic accident model considers accidents as emergent phenomena from 
variability and interactions in a complex system (Hollnagel, 2004). Air traffic risk 
assessments have predominantly been done by sequential and epidemiological 
accident models. In this paper, we have demonstrated the feasibility of a 
practical risk assessment of a runway incursion scenario by a systemic approach 
and showed the unique results that can thus be attained. This systemic approach 
is based on the TOPAZ methodology and uses Monte Carlo simulations of 
dynamic interactions of relevant agents to analyse safety-relevant scenario. Next, 
we discuss key aspects of systemic accident modelling and their relation with the 
methods and results presented in this paper.       
 
A key aspect of systemic accident models is the emergence of accidents due to 
interactions in a complex organization. In the Monte Carlo simulations of the 
runway incursion scenario, accidents may emerge from an unfortunate 
combination in the variability of the performance of the interacting agents, for 
example, an aircraft has just started the take-off run, another aircraft is taxiing 
towards the runway without its pilots knowing their position, the pilot flying of 
the aircraft taking-off does not recognize the conflict in time to stop the aircraft 
before the crossing position, the pilot flying of the aircraft taxiing has not 
noticed the conflict, and the runway controller is alerted but can only 
communicate with the pilots at a stage where they are not able to resolve the 
conflict. In our systemic model, such chains of events are not pre-programmed, 
but they may emerge from the agents’ interactions and performance variability. 
Even the events themselves are often not defined a priori but emerge, for 
example, visual monitoring times and thereby conflict recognition times by the 
pilots are variable and the event that the pilots recognize the conflict in time to 
prevent an accident emerges from the Monte Carlo simulations. Here, events like 
‘recognize the conflict in time’ can only be classified after the scenario has been 
simulated for a specific case; the same visual monitoring interval may be too late 
in some cases and in time in other cases, depending on other agents’ aspects 
like, e.g. the taxiing speed or braking deceleration. In contrast with the 
emergence of safety occurrences in the Monte Carlo simulations, in sequential 
accident models as fault and event trees, events and the ordering of events are 
defined by the safety analyst. To be able to manage the complexity of such 
sequential models, it is usually needed to restrict the number of events and the 
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ways in which they are ordered and interact. Doing so, critical interdependencies 
may be neglected in a risk assessment based on a sequential accident model. 
 
A systemic accident model endeavours to describe the performance of a system 
or operation as a whole. In line with such a wide scope endeavour, the risk 
assessment of the runway incursion scenario presented in this paper considers 
the dynamic interactions between a wide range of human operators and technical 
systems: multiple aircraft, their pilots flying, runway controller, surveillance 
system, communication system and alert system. Moreover, the performance of 
these agents is described for a variety of nominal and non-nominal conditions, 
such as situation awareness differences and technical failures. This broad scope 
is required to obtain meaningful accident risk results in the systemic approach. 
In particular, as accidents in air traffic involve aircraft, which are directly 
controlled by pilots, a systemic accident model for air traffic cannot do without 
models for aircraft and pilot performance. In contrast, in risk assessments using 
sequential accident models it is not unusual to restrict the scope to a (new) 
technical system and its direct relations with other technical systems and human 
operators. For instance, in a related safety case on advanced surface movement 
guidance and control systems (Eurocontrol, 2006), the scope is focused on these 
systems, which allowed to use a sequential accident risk approach. 
 
In line with the broad scope of our systemic accident model, the risk values that 
emerge from the Monte Carlo simulations are based on a broad scope of models 
of the various agents. These models describe variability in the performance of 
technical systems (e.g. aircraft performance during take-off, radar performance), 
human operators (e.g. visual observation, situation awareness) in varying 
contextual conditions (e.g. crossing position, visibility condition). Development 
and use of these models requires a broad knowledge base and a large variety of 
data sources (e.g. aircraft performance data, alert system settings, technical 
failure data, human task durations, etc.). In contrast, in sequential accident 
models like fault and event trees, accident occurrence is based on combining 
events via logical operators and obtaining risk values via event probabilities. 
Thus the kind of knowledge required is considerably different for systemic and 
sequential accident models. 
 
In safety-relevant scenarios involving interactions between multiple dynamic 
agents (as customary in air traffic), the dependencies between risk contributions 
of agents are of special interest. In the presented systemic accident model, these 
risk dependencies emerge from concurrently interacting agents in the 
simulations, for example, observation by a pilot of moving aircraft, or 
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communication between pilot and controller. In a sequential accident model, 
conditional event probabilities must be specified by the safety analyst to cope 
with the dependent dynamics of interacting agents. For instance, the kind of data 
that might be required in such modelling is ‘the probability that an alerted 
controller warns the pilots if the taxiing aircraft is at position X and given that 
the crews of the taxiing aircraft as well as the taking-off aircraft have not yet 
detected the conflict.’ Since it is usually difficult to obtain such conditional 
probabilities, one typically has to assume that events happen independently from 
each other in applying sequential accident models.  
 
The particular results that emerge from the Monte Carlo simulations of the 
considered runway incursion scenario are that in good visibility conditions the 
runway incursion alert system is not an effective means to reduce the conditional 
collision risk. This is not due to poor performance of the modelled runway 
incursion alert system as such: with high probability it provides an alert if the 
considered alert threshold settings are exceeded. However, in good visibility 
conditions, one or both cockpit crews usually have detected the conflict before 
they are warned by the alerted controller, and in the remaining cases the 
controller can usually not timely warn the pilots. In reduced visibility conditions 
(visibility in the range of 400 to 1500 m), the Monte Carlo simulations show that 
the same runway incursion alert system effectively reduces the conditional 
collision risk. In this case, the chance that the pilots have recognized the conflict 
themselves before they are warned by the alerted controller is reduced. These 
different types of results emerge from the systemic accident model basically via a 
difference in the modelled observation distance of the pilots. In contrast, to 
obtain such results by a sequential accident model, one would have the difficult 
job to assess separate event probabilities for the visibility conditions considered. 
 
A validation process of the systemic accident model has been presented that is 
based on assessment of risk effects of (potential) differences between model and 
reality. This assessment is supported by Monte Carlo simulations that provide 
risk point estimates and risk sensitivities for parameter value changes. Since the 
parameter values usually refer to well interpretable processes, the risk sensitivity 
analysis provides added insight in the risk contributions of operational aspects in 
the safety relevant scenario considered. For the runway incursion scenario with 
the particular case that the pilot flying (erroneously) thinks to proceed on a 
normal taxiway in visibility condition 1, the validation process results indicate a 
small risk bias and a sizeable 95% credibility interval. The largest effects on bias 
and uncertainty in this case are due to pilots’ performance; the effects on bias 
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and uncertainty due to controller performance and ATC systems are negligible. It 
means that a reduction in the risk uncertainty in this situation must come from 
better knowledge and data of pilots’ performance.  
 
In conclusion, we have shown that Monte Carlo simulation of safety relevant air 
traffic scenarios, such as used in TOPAZ, is a viable way of systemic accident 
assessment, and we have demonstrated the risk and validation results attainable 
by such modelling for a particular runway incursion scenario. The presented 
approaches can be effectively used to support particular safety cases for 
aerodrome operations. 
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